The Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason is widely believed to be Kant’s central argument and to establish a fit between our most basic concepts (viz., the categories) and objects in the world. I argue for a reframing of the Deduction’s purport. It does not aim to prove that there is such a fit, but rather, at a metaphilosophical level, that there is only one appropriate way to construct such a proof. This reading reveals new aspects of the Deduction’s logical structure and sheds light on the argumentative function of Kant’s later arguments in the System of Principles.

My current research projects build upon my dissertation in order to deepen our understanding of Kant's account of our conceptual entitlements. Some sample, ongoing projects include: 

• An article comparing the representation features of the pure categories and ideas of reason, in order to explain the distinctive traits of ideas which, for Kant, make them impossible to salvage for any theoretical use.

• An article exploring the undertheorized role of transcendental apperception in his practical philosophy, in order to clarify the distinctive constraints on concepts' theoretical and practical use, respectively.

• An article clarifying the link between Kant's philosophy of mathematics and his critique of metaphysics, by reconstructing the Amphiboly's account of systematic rationalist confusions of identity/difference, on the one hand, and form/matter, on the other.

In the future, I plan to extend my research in three directions. 

• First, I intend to continue to explore the ways that distinct forms of conceptual entitlement interact in Kant’s thought; that is, especially in his practical philosophy and philosophy of history I hope to contribute to our understanding of how his differentiation of the species of entitlement enables us to inhabit multiple, apparently incompatible ways of speaking and thinking about our world.  

• Second, I aim to expand my existing research on the nineteenth-century reception of Kant’s critical project. I am particularly interested in Hegel’s methods and standards for the assessment of concepts—or “thought-determinations”—in his Science of Logic. Hegel’s method is, I believe, best understood as inverting the direction-of-fit found in the Kantian critical epistemology. Rather than assessing the viability of our epistemic ends (viz., traditional metaphysical knowledge) in light of facts about our representational means (i.e., concepts), Hegel assesses the fitness of our means in light of facts about our ends.     

• In a similar vein, I also plan to explore alternative methods of conceptual assessment and criticism in modern philosophy; that is, both before and after Kant’s critical project. Conceptual genealogies, for example, appeal to claims about the origin or development of a given concept in order to support normative conclusions about its appropriate use. In future research, I intend to chart the species of conceptual genealogies, by investigating the distinct shapes this kind of procedure takes in the projects of thinkers like Hume and Nietzsche.  

1. Hettig-Role, Kasey. "Swimming Problems: Hegel, Kant, and the Demand for Meta-Theory."  European Journal of Philosophy. Forthcoming.

2. Hettig-Rolfe, Kasey (2022). "François Raffoul, Thinking the Event." Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43 (1):187-190.

Under Review

1. An article about Kant's early pre-critical views on conceptual containment relations.

Preparing

1. An article reconstructing the role of 'abstraction' in the B-Deduction.